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Abstract 
The promotion of peace and security in Africa necessitates security 
cooperation between states and collective security remains a way to 
pursue it. This paper explores the changed meaning and application of 
the concept of collective security within the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) to deal with both interstate and intrastate security 
concerns within the African Union (AU). Since the AU has made clear 
commitments to collective security, the aim is to determine to what 
extent the AU subscribed to collective security and applied it in terms of 
coercion, which includes interventions. While dealing with genocide, 
war crimes and extended presidential terms remains problematic, the 
AU has taken an assertive stand with the use of coercion in cases of 
unconstitutional changes of government. The article highlights the ten-
sion between the theory and practice of collective security in Africa. 
1. Introduction 
The pursuance of security involves much uncertainty for states. Most 
countries find it difficult to promote their national security, by acting 
alone (Booth 1987: 303). States, therefore, often work together towards 
improving their security. According to Booth (1987: 261), "the absence 
of credible defensive alliances can leave the international system at the 
mercy of the aggressive". Modern states have in pursuance of security, 
not only relied on alliances and coalitions, but also on the rules-based 
system of collective security, which was a creation of Article 16 of the 
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Covenant of the League of Nations and subsequently, the United 
Nations (UN), in an effort to establish and maintain international peace 
and security. Collective security is based on the principle that an attack 
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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all states have to stop the aggressor. In Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
collective security is considered a legal right, together with self-defence. 
One of the main differences between alliances and collective security is 
that the former is established against a current and known threat, and 
the latter for future and unknown threats.   
Since the establishment of the League of Nations and the UN, 
collective security has functioned as a parallel component of the chang-
ing international security landscape first with the balance-of-power 
system, followed by a post-Cold War unipolar system, with growing 
elements of a multipolar world. The system of collective security could 
not prevent the outbreak of the Second World War (1939-1945) and 
has been largely underutilised by the UN during the Cold War, mainly 
due to superpower rivalry in the UN Security Council. During the Cold 
War, the concept of peacekeeping was developed by the UN, which 
was not contained in the UN Charter (Boutros-Ghali 2009: xxii). The 
UN's successful collective response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (1990) 
created optimism that collective security could become the international 
norm in the post-Cold War era (Snyder 1999: 108-109). This optimism 
was, however, short-lived with the ineffective UN responses to crises in 
Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans, as well as the inept nature of multi-
national UN peace operations. As a result, the permanent members of 
the UN Security Council in the West started to rely on the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) to address security issues in Europe, while 
regions with less strategic importance, including sub-Saharan Africa, 
were largely avoided in terms of peace operations/deployments (Cole-
man 2011: 533). This effectively devolved much of the responsibility to 
deal with conflicts in Africa to regional and subregional organisations. 
The role of regional security institutions, therefore, became more prom-
inent to deal with instability in Africa (Snyder 1999: 109).   
Collective security had been designed mainly at the global level, 
but has become a prominent concept for regional and subregional 
security. Collective security was intended to deal mainly with interstate 
conflict, yet most armed conflicts since the Cold War have been intra-
state in nature (Vogt 2009: 252-253). African countries have, therefore, 
adopted collective security principles to manage both interstate and 
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intrastate conflict. Collective security features prominently in the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).  
The aim of this article is to discuss the prominence of collective 
security in the AU's security architecture. This will be done by highlight-
ing to what extent the AU subscribed to collective security, with specific 
reference to the collective use of coercion. The tension between the 
theory of collective security and practice is pointed out. 
In the first part of the article, collective security as a concept is 
explained with reference to how it differs from alliances and other 
related concepts, and how the meaning and application of the concept 
has changed within the international system. Theoretical aspects on the 
concept collective security and the critique around the concept are 
discussed. The second part focuses on the prominence of collective 
security principles together with the principle of non-indifference within 
the APSA, as well as the AU's application of collective security with 
reference to the use of coercion. Reference is made to the crisis in 
Burundi, which highlights the tension within the AU between principles 
of non-interference and non-difference and thus also state-centric 
principles and collective security. 
2. Understanding collective security 
Between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the early 1900s, Euro-
pean countries formed part of a balance-of-power system (Papp 1997: 
48-49). This is a system in which states pursue security within an an-
archic context by joining alliances in order to prevent a single centre of 
power (a particular group of states) from dominating the international 
system and becoming expansionist (McLean 1996: 30-31). Within a 
balance-of-power system states can change alliances to promote equi-
librium between centres of power (Papp 1997: 48-49). The balance-of-
power system, however, failed with the outbreak of the First World War 
and as a result of its horrific nature and aftermath, collective security 
was pursued through the League of Nations. One of the flaws of col-
lective security is that one or more states may refuse to act when 
another member state is being attacked. This weakness contributed 
towards the outbreak of the Second World War, when several states 
invaded other countries, without any action being taken. This was the 
case during the invasion of Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) by Italy in October 
1935, as well as the German invasion of Poland in September 1939. 
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It is important to have conceptual clarity on the meaning of col-
lective security for two reasons. Firstly, some literature on collective 
security uses the term alliances to describe 'collective security'. For ex-
ample, Rappard (1946: 195) defined collective security as "the protec-
tion which so-called 'sovereign states' have sought to attain in their 
alliances against aggression". Secondly, the meaning of concepts such 
as collective security and alliances are often misused and distorted, 
especially by politicians (Booth 1987: 259). Booth (1987: 259), with par-
ticular reference to alliances, argued that such distortion of concepts 
often occurs where an impression of cohesion is created for very loose 
agreements for cooperation.     
Alliances are a form of collective defence and involve formal 
agreements between states to work together in pursuance of their na-
tional security goals and focus on enhancing military power and co-
ordinating deployments (Booth 1987: 258). Alliances can also be used 
to pursue common norms and interests, as well as to achieve a 
balance of power for the purpose of a stable international system (Che-
noweth 2008: 64-65). Alliances usually involve a commitment between 
like-minded states against a known threat, which can include an 
opposing regional power. A collective defence organisation can be 
defined as a bilateral or multilateral military alliance between states for 
collective action against another state or set of states (Weitsman 2014: 
"*   	1
2-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty 
(bilateral alliance), and the former multilateral alliance of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation/Warsaw Pact (Chenoweth 2008: 64-65). An al-
liance requires at least one state to use military force when necessary, 
and in general the level of military cooperation of each country, is an 
indication of its commitment to the alliance (Snyder 1999: 105). While 
alliances encompass long-term agreements, coalitions are of ad hoc 
and temporary nature to undertake a specific campaign or operation 
(Weitsman 2014: 26-27). Coalitions-of-the-willing may offer advantages 
in terms of composition and legitimacy, but often present practical prob-
lems in terms of command and control, and coordinating operations, 
due to lack of interoperability. 
Collective security on the other hand, is a legally binding agree-
ment between states (that are not necessarily like-minded) to not use 
force to resolve current or future disputes, and to act collectively against 
those states that break this rule (Snyder 1999: 107-109). It requires 
states to surrender some of their sovereignty to a supra-national body, 
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which in this context would involve certain restrictions on autonomous 
military action (Chenoweth 2008: 65). Collective security, therefore, 
involves a rules-based system, in which collective and overwhelming 
action is taken against aggressor-states. According to Papp (1997: 
153), collective security relies on "the major actors within the system 
accepting its legitimacy and responding together to punish those who 
did not". There are various perspectives on what collective security 
entails, which will receive attention.  
There are several conditions for collective security to be suc-
cessful (McLean 1996: 82-83). Firstly, states have to be content with 
the status quo including existing state boundaries and only use military 
force when defending other states or their own territory. Secondly, 
states must have consensus on what aggression means and in which 
instances member states have to defend one or more states. Thirdly, all 
member states and especially strong powers have to commit their 
armed forces and resources to stop aggression, or provide the neces-
sary resources in time for another member state or states to do it. This 
must be done even for distant countries, where other states have little if 
any interests. Lastly, all member states must refrain from and avert any 
contravention of sanctions that may aid aggressor states.  
Collective security exists when states conform to certain norms 
and rules to prevent major war and when necessary, stop acts of ag-
gression (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995: 52-53). Competition between 
states contribute towards international stability (that is, balance of 
power), which should be harnessed within a regulated system instead 
of having "unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of 
each for his own" (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995: 52-53). The latter 
represents an anarchic setup where states only repel aggression when 
they are directly affected by it, or have vital interests at stake in a spe-
cific geographical area (Kupchan and Kupchan1995: 54-55). In a nut-
shell, their argument is that some form of collective security-institution 
to manage competition and disputes between states, is better than no 
institution. Collective security can thus also serve as an overarching 
system to control other forms of security cooperation, within a rules-
based system, based on international law. 
Whereas much of the aspects of collective security involve a 
realist perspective of security, neoliberal institutionalists argue that 
collective security can facilitate the transformation of the competitive na-
ture of state relations into a peaceful system of demilitarised interstate 
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competition, based on the rule of law (Snyder 1999: 107-108). Collect-
ive security can, therefore, arguably be pursued by both realists and 
idealists. Neoliberal institutionalists furthermore argue that a collective 
security system can facilitate such a process by changing the interests 
and behaviour of states, as they become more aware of shared in-
terests and security concerns (Snyder 1999: 107-108). It is also argued 
that as states subscribe to and apply the norms and rules of a collective 
security system, they may decide to continue this form of security 
cooperation and consequently build trust and enhance expectations of 
maintaining stability. By enhancing trust, it is argued that arms races 
and the security dilemma3) can be avoided.  
Collective security within the international system currently func-
tions within the UN, with principles of collective security contained in the 
UN Charter (Snyder 1999: 108-109). The UN system of collective se-
curity is dependent on the cooperation of the five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council, namely the United States (US), Britain, 
France, Russia and China. During the Cold War, it was difficult to reach 
consensus on UN military interventions and, therefore, the UN military 
response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, was an 
exception to the rule, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) at the time boycotted the UN Security Council in an attempt to 
have the permanent Chinese seat on the Council allocated to the 
communist Chinese government and not Taiwan. Another unique case 
was UN approval for up-scaling the UN mission in the Congo (1960-
1964) from a peacekeeping mission to an intervention mission in 1961 
(United Nations 2001). The permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, therefore, control the UN's collective security system and 
decisions on sanctions and interventions. This means that individual 
states cannot rely on this system for support when facing a crisis in 
terms of national defence. Yet national defence has, since the Cold 
War, rarely been the biggest concern for most states, since transna-
tional and intrastate threats have become more incessant and imme-
diate threats. 
The terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 (9/11), set 
in motion significant change in the interpretation and application of the 
concept of collective security, for pursuing more robust responses to 
international terrorism. In the 2004 'Report of the Secretary-General's 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change', the use of milit-
ary force for self-defence was considered justified, if a threat was 'im-
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minent' to a country's national security (United Nations 2004: 63, par 
188). According to Boutros-Ghali (2009: xxv), this is a deviation from 
the UN Charter's Article 51, which makes provision for individual or col-
lective self-defence only if an armed attack actually 'occurs' (Boutros-
Ghali 2009: xxv).   
The above-mentioned report made several recommendations 
that became influential in terms of understanding and applying col-
lective security within the UN context. Firstly, that the international com-
munity has a collective 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) civilians in any 
state suffering gross human rights violations, even if their own govern-
ment does not take responsibility to protect them, or is itself guilty of 
atrocities against them (United Nations 2004: 65, par 201). Military 
intervention to protect civilians is, even without the permission of the 
'host-nation' government, considered a possible, though last resort. The 
UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 regarding the 
protection of Libyan civilians, is an application of this principle. The sub-
sequent intervention and regime change in Libya by NATO, is an ex-
ample of its abuse.  
The second recommendation of the High-level Panel, was that 
regional security structures have to fill the void in the UN's limited peace 
operations capacity and conduct peace operations within their regions, 
with UN approval and accountability to the UN (United Nations 2004: 
69, par 220). Thirdly, that development is a foundation of collective 
security as part of an overarching effort to prevent conflict (United Na-
tions 2004: 23), which is indicative of the human security paradigm of 
the UN, which also informs its emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction 
and development. 
There are several points of critique regarding collective security. 
Firstly, that the definition of collective security is too restrictive, since it 
focuses on formal, legally-binding commitments by states to act, when-
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arrangements for security cooperation (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995: 
53). Secondly, that the League of Nations and the UN in theory do not 
serve as ideal examples of collective security, since neither facilitated 
binding commitments to stop aggression (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995: 
54). Moreover, the establishment of an 'inner council' to determine col-
lective action in both these organisations (that is, Council of the League 
of Nations and the UN Security Council), is viewed as serving the in-
terests of only a few great powers, rather than the international system. 
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Thirdly, that within a large system of collective security with strong 
powers, many states may decide to 'free-ride' and not make significant 
contributions towards the collective security system. This could weaken 
the entire collective security system. Fourthly, that the possibility of 
having to use war in order to prevent it, makes the solution equally as 
destructive as the problem (Rappard 1946: 196 with reference to Walter 
Lippman). This could also make the implementation of collective secur-
ity extremely expensive in terms of resources. Lastly, that collective 
security systems are generally unable to enforce their norms and, 
therefore, states have no guarantee that member states within the col-
lective security system will actually come to their rescue, when being 
threatened or attacked.   
Collective security is not a fool-proof solution to preventing war, 
since various efforts to do so, have failed (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995: 
53). Optimism for collective security seems to increase shortly after 
devastating wars, but tends to wane when interstate tensions and 
threats rise, and states subsequently want immediate, decisive action 
through military coercion. Collective security has not worked in practice, 
which points to a disjuncture between theory and practice on this 
concept, as well as its weakness compared to the concept of alliances 
(Booth 1987: 302). Booth (1987: 303) argues that "collective security in 
its pure theory is a dream" and that neutralism and non-alignment are 
unlikely to become longstanding international norms. In the next 
sections, the extent to which collective security was embraced and ap-
plied by the AU, will receive attention. 
3. Collective security in Africa 
Since decolonisation various aspects have for long inhibited a unified 
approach to deal with crises and armed conflicts in Africa, which include 
post-colonial patronage, Cold War alignment and different views on 
security (Bach 2014: 182). For example, Pan-Africanists favoured the 
political and military unification of Africa and supported Nkrumah's pro-
posal in 1958 for an African High Command and the inception of an 
African Legion (Franke 2008: 317). The nationalists, however, were 
hesitant to hand over their hard-earned sovereignty and, thus, opposed 
ideas of unification and collective intervention. This nationalist and 
internally-focussed view continued to strain closer security cooperation 
until the end of the Cold War (Franke 2008: 318). Instead of subscribing 
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to the principle of collective security, many African states that became 
independent with decolonisation since the 1950s were, from a security 
perspective, relatively weak and opted for political neutralism and non-
alignment in particular (Booth 1987: 302-303). This was an attempt to 
remain untouched by superpower rivalry. 
The nationalist perspective has been the predominant perspect-
ive in Africa ever since the establishment of the Organisation for African 
Unity (OAU) in 1963 and it followed a non-interventionist approach to 
conflicts in Africa until 1993 (Domson-Lindsay 2015: 8-10). The OAU's 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs inhibited action in cases 
where civilians suffered at the hands of their own governments. Ex-
amples of non-interference include the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) 
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(1971-1979) where thousands were killed (Ekwealor and Okeke-Uzodike 
2016: 65). The OAU seemed to overlook serious human rights viola-
tions and to accommodate dictators. Widespread incidents of instability, 
such as foreign interventions, coups and mercenary activities in Africa, 
were stark reminders of the need for some form of collective security, 
especially since the OAU's security architecture had significant limita-
tions.  
The OAU, however, lacked the capacity for a collective security 
system. It did not have the necessary legal and institutional structure to 
conduct peace operations in accordance with the UN Charter (May and 
Massey 1998: 51). It also had major shortcomings in terms of logistic 
and financial capacity, which became evident in its first peacekeeping 
mission during the civil war in Chad between 1980 and 1982 (May and 
Massey 1998: 46-48). This was a precursor of difficulties that future 
African peace operations would face.4) Years later, the Economic Com-
munity for West African States (ECOWAS) decided to intervene on its 
own during the Liberian crisis (in August 1990), due to the OAU's failure 
in Chad and the UN Security Council's reluctance to intervene in the 
Liberian internal security situation. This was an indication that sub-
regional organisations would in future play a more important role in 
terms of promoting security in Africa. 
3.1 The shift from non-interference to non-
indifference 
The establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
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Management and Resolution in 1993 could not address the OAU's ca-
pacity challenges to deal with conflict in Africa and given the UN's 
selective engagement at the time, the OAU conducted limited peace 
missions in the Great Lakes and the Comoros (Williams 2014: 68-69). 
It was up to subregional organisations to deal with internal conflicts and 
both ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) conducted several intervention operations since the early 1990s. 
However, military involvement in domestic conflicts also presented di-
lemmas. The international community and Africa's regional and sub-
regional organisations learned hard lessons in the 1990s from the risks 
pertaining to casualties in peace operations in intense and complex 
internal conflicts such as Somalia, following the so-called Black Hawk 
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the Rwandan genocide (Vogt 2009: 254-255).   
African states have subsequently moved from the principle of 
non-interference towards accepting the principle of non-indifference, 
which means that intervention in an intrastate conflict is justified when 
gross violations such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against hu-
manity are occurring. This coincides with the broader international shift 
towards the principle of R2P (Engel and Porto 2014: 191). The OAU, 
which became the AU in 2002, together with African subregional organ-
isations, decided to establish a security architecture and military capa-
city to deal with security emergencies in Africa, within the framework of 
the UN Charter. Mwanasali (2008: 41) describes this shift to the prin-
ciple of non-indifference, as an interventionist phase in the continent's 
management of peace and security. Tension, however, still exists within 
Africa between the state-centred principles of non-interference and that 
of R2P. 
	 	'1  	7D
and have to be 'renegotiated' among member states on certain deci-
sions, due to the tension with state-centred principles and thinking, 
which was predominant in the OAU (Engel and Porto 2014: 191). In 
Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the AU (hereinafter referred to as the 
Constitutive Act), the AU aims to ensure the independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of African states (AU Constitutive Act 2000: 
Article 3: 5). In Article 4 of the same Act, the AU upholds the following 
principles regarding the security of its member states: respect for 
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affairs of states (AU Constitutive Act 2000: Article 4: 6-7). Yet, the AU in 
principle rejects unconstitutional changes in governments and has the 
right to intervene in member states on request, or in cases of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes (AU Constitutive Act 2000: 
Article 4: 7). Bach (2014: 186) argues that the AU, by international stand-
ards, has the most prominent provisions for intervening in the domestic 
affairs of a member state. According to Mwanasali (2008: 52), the AU's 
principle of non-indifference implies that collective security decisions 
are binding on member states and take precedence over national polit-
ical considerations or legislation. However, the opposing principles of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of states — versus the principle 
of non-indifference — can create difficulties in deciding on whether to 
intervene in a particular situation or not. 
3.2 The AU and collective security 
The AU considers peace,5) stability and security as preconditions for 
development on the continent (AU Constitutive Act, 2000: 3). Further-
more, African countries consider their defence and security linked to 
each other and the continent as a whole (CADSP 2004: par 12(i), p 7). 
The AU views sustainable development as important for collective se-
curity, peace and stability (AU Non-aggression and Common Defence 
Pact 2005: 1). In this sense, development is viewed as a way to pre-
vent insecurity, instability and war. The AU, therefore, follows a 'positive 
peace' perspective rather than a 'negative peace' perspective. The lat-
ter refers to the mere absence of war and personal violence, while 
'positive peace' also includes social justice, the integration of human 
society, as well as development (Galtung 1969: 183). 
The AU has rectified the legal framework for conducting peace 
operations in accordance with the UN Charter. The AU has accepted 
the provisions of the UN Charter and bestowed upon the UN Security 
Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, as well as the provisions of the Charter on the role 
of regional arrangements ... in the maintenance of international peace 
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AU, therefore, recognises the authority of the UN Security Council in 
overseeing collective security among UN member states. The AU, thus, 
provided the legal framework for connecting the AU and relevant sub-
regional organisations in Africa to the international security architecture 
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and collective security system of the UN (Vogt 2009: 256). 
Collective security features prominently in the AU's principles 
regarding defence and security. In the Protocol Relating to the Estab-
lishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, the AU supports 
the promotion of collective security, together with the prevention of con-
flicts (AU Protocol 2002: 3). Article 2 of this Protocol makes provision for 
the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU, 
as a collective security and early-warning arrangement to prevent, 
manage and resolve conflicts (AU Protocol 2002: 4). The AU's commit-
ment to collective security is reinforced in the AU Non-Aggression and 
Common Defence Pact (AU Defence Pact 2005: Article 2c: 7) which 
specifies that "any aggression or threat of aggression against any of the 
Member States shall be deemed to constitute a threat or aggression 
against all Member States of the Union" (AU Defence Pact 2005: Article 
E*
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means available against aggression or threats thereof (AU Defence 
Pact 2005: Article 4b). The AU member states have, therefore, made a 
clear commitment to collective security. 
The AU makes provision for collective responses to both inter-
state (or external threats) and intrastate/internal threats (CADSP 2004: 
par 13(a), p 8). African states have committed themselves towards col-
laboration and mutual assistance between member states to improve 
their security and intelligence capacities, as well as to combat trans-
national threats such as terrorism, organised crime and subversion (AU 
Defence Pact 2005: Article 5a, p 8). In Article 5 of the AU Defence Pact, 
African states undertook to prohibit the use of their territory as spring-
boards for insurgency, terrorism or mercenary activities — into other 
states (AU Defence Pact 2005: Article 5). The AU Protocol also makes 
provision for a common African defence policy and African Standby 
Force (AU Protocol 2002: 4-5).   
3.3 AU decision-making on collective security 
measures 
Article 5 of the AU Protocol makes provision for the election of the 15-
member PSC, with equitable regional representation, by the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government of the AU. The PSC is authorised to 
prevent and stop conflicts by means of (among others) peacemaking, 
sanctions and peace operations. The PSC can make recommenda-
Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 39, No 1                                                               Evert Jordaan 
172 
 
tions for interventions for approval by the Assembly (AU Protocol 2002: 
Article 7, par 1-e), and such approval requires a two-thirds majority in 
the Assembly (Constitutive Act 2000: Article 7, par 1). Decisions on de-
ployments by the PSC have to be made by a quorum of at least ten 
mem'1D('$+8
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which a two-thirds majority is required for taking action (AU Protocol 
2002: Article 8, par 8). The AU, therefore, has an 'inner-council' that 
makes decisions on most deployments, except peace enforcement. 
Unlike the UN Security Council, no PSC member has a veto right to 
block interventions or sanctions (Engel and Porto 2011: 17).  
The Chairperson of the AU Commission is responsible for ex-
ecuting the decisions of the PSC and for appointing special repres-
entatives and force commanders for missions (AU Protocol 2002: 
Articles 10 and 13). Article 13 of the AU Protocol (2002: 18-19) further-
more makes provision for the establishment of the African Standby 
Force (ASF), consisting of five subregional standby contingents to per-
form the following functions and missions, as directed by the PSC: ob-
servation and monitoring, preventative deployment, peace operations 
and interventions, peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict 
disarmament and demobilisation, as well as support in natural disasters 
(CADSP 2004: par 1(iii), p 18). The ASF has to cooperate with the UN 
and its agencies (AU Protocol 2002: Article 13, par 4). African countries 
are committed to "provide all possible assistance" to peace operations 
authorised by the PSC, as well as to the employment of the ASF (AU 
Defence Pact 2005: Article 10a, p 10). The ASF is, therefore, an AU 
military instrument for enforcing collective security in Africa.   
Article 13 of the AU Protocol (2002: par 16, p 21), makes provi-
sion for close cooperation between the UN and the AU for the purpose 
of capacity-building for the ASF in terms of logistics, equipment, train-
ing, communications and funding. UN involvement in African peace 
operations, thus, made regional peace operations and the involvement 
of subregional powers more viable. According to Vogt (2009: 257) 
"African regional organisations are increasingly taking the lead in the 
initial stages of conflicts, hosting and leading political negotiations on 
the cessation of hostilities, and undertaking the first phases of military 
deployments, as occurred during the missions in Liberia in 2003 and 
Burundi in 2004". More recently, regional peace operations are con-
sidered precursors for UN or hybrid missions (Coleman 2011: 525).  
The AU has made significant contributions to managing conflict 
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in Africa. For example, the AU is currently involved in the so-called 
hybrid mission with the UN in Darfur (UNAMID). In addition, the AU is 
also conducting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as 
well as the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the elimination of the LRA 
(RCI-LRA) (African Union 2015b). A number of intervention and peace 
operations had also been conducted under the auspices of the AU and 
subregional organisations on the continent.   
3.4 Operationalising collective security in Africa 
Previously, it was highlighted that within the context of collective secur-
ity, the AU has the authority to intervene in a member state in the fol-
lowing instances: to protect a member state against military aggression, 
on request of a member state, as well as in cases of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. This section pays attention to the 
extent to which the AU applied collective security principles with specific 
reference to the use of coercion. How the AU deals with genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in terms of state actors, will be 
covered first.  
3.4.1 Genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
The last genocide in Africa was the Rwandan genocide. Although 
Darfur is a controversial case following allegations of genocide, the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-
General concluded that the government of Sudan did not follow a policy 
of genocide, but that Sudanese government forces and militias commit-
ted crimes against humanity (United Nations 2005: 4). This Commis-
sion recommended that the matter be referred to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), by the UN Security Council, which the latter did in 
2005 (UN Security Council resolution 1593). Subsequently, the ICC 
issued warrants of arrest for President Omar El Bashir of Sudan (in 
May 2009 and July 2010), as well as Bashir's former Minister of Interior, 
Abdel Raheen Muhammed Hussein in March 2012 — for (among 
others) crimes against humanity and war crimes (ICC 2016). The AU, 
however, does not agree with the UN or the ICC decisions on this and 
expects these organisations to stop the prosecution of Bashir (African 
Union 2016b). The AU also expects its members to comply with the AU 
position — not to arrest Bashir. This is based on the principled decision 
Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 39, No 1                                                               Evert Jordaan 
174 
 
that serving heads of state should enjoy immunity against prosecution, 
which led to the scrapping of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights' jurisdiction to prosecute serving heads of state, by means of an 
amendment of the AU protocol on this court in June 2014 (African 
Union 2014: Article 46A bis: 38-39). It also demonstrates the reluctance 
of the AU to intervene in Darfur, despite evidence of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Williams argues that this is an indication of the 
lack of consensus in the AU on how and when to consistently use its in-
struments of coercion (Williams 2010: 100). Considering the AU's limited 
military capacity to intervene, it is also easier for the AU to intervene in 
small countries with weak militaries such as the Comoros (Williams 
2011: 156), than having to intervene in countries with significant military 
capacity such as Sudan, or without consent, which would strain unity 
within the AU. In late October 2016, both Burundi and South Africa 
gave notice to the UN Secretary-General that they were going to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute and consequently from the ICC (UN 
News Centre 2016). This is due to discontent and concerns that the 
ICC mainly prosecutes African leaders. This withdrawal raises fears 
that more African states could follow suit, which would be a major set-
back for the international system of criminal justice and the prevention 
of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
3.4.2 Protection against military aggression 
Since interstate war is generally not a prominent phenomenon in Africa, 
the protection of AU member states against acts of military aggression 
by other member states, is not a priority in Africa. Besides state inter-
ventions in civil wars (for example, Rwanda and Uganda in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo), the last interstate war between African coun-
tries, was between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000 (Marshall 
2016a). After the end of the Cold War, the OAU did not conduct any 
peace enforcement operations until 2002 and mostly conducted 
observer missions (Williams 2014: 68-73). Subregional organisations in 
Africa did, however, conduct several peace enforcement operations be-
tween 1990 and 2003. These included ECOMOG 1 (Economic Com-
munity Cease-! # &*  5  899  8999
0.H#H&25899:0.H#H&)&-
Bissau from 1998 to 1999 which was both a peacebuilding and peace 
H25-
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tion by SADC states (Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia) in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from August 1998- 

Operation Boleas was conducted by SADC states (South Africa and 
Botswana) in Lesotho from September 1998-1999. AMISOM in Soma-
lia (since March 2007), with its robust mandate that makes provision for 
offensive operations, can also be considered a peace enforcement 
operation. The AU, however, has only conducted one official peace 
enforcement operation, which was in the Comoros in 2008 to prevent 
secession (Operation Democracy in the Comoros). Peace enforcement 
operations since the establishment of the AU are, therefore, few in 
terms of frequency, which makes the requirement for collective security 
from an interstate-war perspective, low in demand.   
African states and especially subregional powers have, due to 
limited capacity, become reluctant to conduct large-scale and drawn-
out peace operations or interventions, such as those conducted by the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia 
(1990-1997) and Sierra Leone from 1997 to 1999 (Coleman 2011: 
525). Nigeria for example declined involvement in the ECOWAS 
mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) from 2002 to 2004 (Coleman 2011: 
522). There was a realisation that African states do not have sufficient 
capacity to sustain such operations without additional support. With the 
establishment of the AU, this realisation was already clear.  
3.4.3 Unconstitutional changes in government 
As mentioned in a previous section, the AU in principle rejects unconsti-
tutional changes in government, within member states (AU Constitutive 
Act 2000: Article 4: 7). On 30 January 2007, the AU adopted the African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (African Union 2007), 
which defined unconstitutional changes in government in terms of the 
following actions against a democratically elected government: coups
     
 

 
	,A	
	

,

"amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which 
is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of govern-
ment".  The African Charter's definition, however, did not make provi-
sion for democratic uprisings, which later became problematic when 
the AU had to decide on a course of action following democratic up-
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rising in Egypt against the regime of Hosni Mubarak, during the Arab 
Spring (Van Wyk 2014: 75).  
In December 2009, the AU accepted the 'Ezulwini Framework 
for the Enhancement of the Implementation of Measures of the African 
Union in Situations of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in 
Africa', which strengthened measures for the implementation of an AU 
sanctions committee (AU Commission 2009: 1). Although the AU has 
been largely reluctant to intervene in the domestic affairs of member 
states, it has taken a strong position against unconstitutional changes 
in governments and has demonstrated steadiness in condemning 
coups in Africa (Williams 2011: 153-154). Yet the AU's view of unconsti-
tutional changes to government was, at least initially, narrowly focussed 
on coups.  
According to Vines (2013: 91-92), there were 12 coup d'etats in 
Africa between 2003 and 2012, of which the AU suspended most 
countries as depicted in Table 1. These included: the suspension of 
and sanctions against the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2003 
following a coup 6=='1@$
pressure for elections following a coup
	
in the Comoros following separatist rebellion on the island of Anjouan in 
2007, which was followed by the AU's first official military intervention in 
	#9
a coup  &

coup, 
		
 #
+ 	
Ravalomana by Rajoelina, the AU imposed a travel ban against the 
7
 8	'1

.O
3/-
low

&


2012 the AU suspended Mali and endorsed ECOWAS sanctions 
   &-Bissau was suspended in April 
2012 after a coup 
  8) 	  coups in the CAR and 
Egypt. Usually the AU lifts sanctions against member states after six 
months to two years, after elections have been held, or when govern-
ments start to comply with AU demands.  
In most cases of coup d'etats, the AU imposed sanctions on the 
relevant countries, with the support of regional economic communities 
on the continent, the UN and in some cases even the European Union 
(EU) to enforce it (Vines 2013: 91-92). The AU, however, does not often 
take action against African governments that try to remain longer in 
power than what their countries' constitutions allow. The current situa-
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tion in Burundi seems to be another case in point. 
 
3.4.4 The case of Burundi 
The AU's decisions on the ongoing crisis in Burundi have become an 
important case for the AU in terms of testing the importance of the 
principle of non-indifference (in order to protect civilians) versus non-
interference in a state's domestic affairs and the principle of state 
sovereignty. This crisis has involved large-scale violence, killings, human 
rights abuses and displacement of people, following the announcement 
in April 2015 that President Pierre Nkurunziza was nominated for a third 
term in office, which was before Burundi's Constitutional Court's ruling 
in favour of another term (Bedzigui and Alusala 2016: 2-3). Serious alle-
Table 1: Coup d'etats in the AU Since 2002 
Country Date/s Occurrence AU Response 
Central African 
Republic 
2003
2013 
Coupa
Coupb 
SanctionsC
Suspended 
Comoros 2007 Secessionc 2'1
Intervention (2008)c 
Cote d’Ivoire 2011 Civil Ward 
(post-election) 
Sanctionsc 
Egypt 2013 Coupa Suspended 
Guinea 2008 Coupa 2

2c 
Guinea-Bissau 2003
2012 
Coupa
Coupa 
No Suspensione
Suspendedc 
Mali 2012 Coupb Suspendede+2
Asset Freezes & Travel 
Bansc 
Madagascar 2009 Coupc Suspendede, Travel ban 
on leaders of Rajoelina 
administrationc 
Mauritania 2005
2008 
Coupa
Coupa 
Suspendede
Suspended, Sanctionsc 
Niger 2010 Coupa Suspendede 
Togo 2005 Coupa Suspendede, Sanctionsc 
Sources: 
 a. Marshall and Ramsey Marshal (2016).
 b. Marshall (2016a).
 c. Vines (2013).
 d. Marshall, (2016b).
 e. Souaré (2014). 
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gations of political pressure on the Constitutional Court judges' ruling 
have been made. The security situation was aggravated by an at-
tempted coup in May 2015 and subsequent government repression.   
On 17 October 2015, the PSC decided to impose targeted sanc-
tions and travel bans against Burundians who contributed to the con-
tinuation of violence (African Union 2015a: par 12). On 17 December 
2015, the PSC in light of the deteriorating security situation in Burundi, 
decided to authorise the deployment of 5 000 peacekeepers to form 
the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), 
to monitor the security situation, protect civilian populations under threat, 
create conditions for dialogue, to facilitate an agreement between 
parties as well as the disarmament of militias and the protection of polit-
ical leaders (African Union 2015c: 3). The Burundian government has, 
however, refused to allow the deployment of the AU peacekeeping 
force and would consider their deployment an invasion (Bedzigui and 
Alusala 2016: 5-7). At the PSC Summit (at the level of Heads of State 
and Government) on 29 January 2016, in contrast to its earlier position, 
member states did not support a peacekeeping deployment in Burundi, 
nor the implementation of any sanctions (African Union 2016a: par 11). 
The Burundian government has furthermore refused to allow 228 UN 
police officers to deploy in the country as mandated by UN Security 
Council Resolution 2303 of 29 July 2016 (African Union 2016c: par 7). 
The AU has, thus, decided to defer the deployment of the MAPROBU 
peacekeeping force. The AU has deployed an undersized group of 
human rights observers and military experts to Burundi, which is largely 
unable to conduct its work in the absence of a memorandum of under-
standing between the AU and the Burundi government (Bedzigui and 
Alusala 2016: 4). The current indecision in the AU regarding Burundi is 
an indication that there is still no clear consensus on the primacy of non-
indifference versus non-interference, or how and when the coercive 
instruments of the AU should be used for continental security. More-
over, this case also highlights the tension between a rules-based and 
supranational approach (of the AU Commission) versus the state-
centric views of AU member states. 
3.4.5 Challenges for collective security in Africa 
The AU faces various overall challenges that put pressure on the 
continental security system and which constrain the operationalisation 
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of collective security. According to Williams, African states do not up-
hold the ideals of the AU in terms of self-restraint to prevent the per-
petuation of armed conflict, nor follow a principled approach to deal with 
it (Williams 2010: 101-102). Instead of the latter, African states often 
choose sides around an insurgency between a government and rebels. 
African states lack cooperation on political and security issues, which 
complicates continental consensus-building on issues such as how to 
reform the UN Security Council. Interpersonal relations between many 
African heads of state are strained and one cannot assume that African 
statesmen will consider their neighbouring countries' military inventories 
as common regional security assets and not as potential threats. 
Furthermore, several AU missions involve troop contributing countries 
with a direct interest in stabilising the particular country and supporting 
its regime (Coleman 2011: 530). For example, Uganda is in effect 
running the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in an attempt to curb al-
Shabaab. Many of these challenges are aspects that AU member 
states have undertook to avoid. 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to discuss the prominence of collective 
security within the APSA, by highlighting to what extent these organisa-
tions subscribed to collective security and applied it in terms of coercive 
measures. The AU member states have clearly committed themselves 
to the principles of collective security within the context of the APSA.  
The concept of collective security underwent significant changes 
in terms of scope since the inception of the League of Nations. Initially it 
focussed mainly on keeping international peace by preventing inter-
state war between states through a legally binding agreement that if 
one state in a system is attacked, the others will come to its aid. More 
recently, collective security is applied on a regional level in Africa for both 
interstate and intrastate threats. Following the Rwandan genocide and 
9/11, a more pre-emptive and interventionist approach to collective se-
curity was followed internationally, which focussed on responding to 
imminent threats, as well as protecting civilians and preventing gross 
violations of human rights, such as genocide. This was later referred to 
as R2P. This required the OAU and later the AU to make a shift from 
the narrow principle of non-interference towards accommodating non-
indifference. Yet, the AU did not discard state-centred principles of re-
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spect for national boundaries and non-interference in domestic affairs. 
This makes for a difficult balancing act, which still produces major 
tension within the AU to act consistently in dealing with crises, and 
determining courses of action with its extensive powers to intervene. 
This portrays the tension that exists between the theory and practice of 
collective security through so-called 'inner councils', which subordinate 
the functioning of collective security to the narrow interests of a few 
states, as opposed to a strict rules-based collective security system.   
The AU accepted collective security in accordance with the UN 
Charter, which provides a legal framework for connecting the AU and 
subregions in Africa to the international collective security system over-
seen by the UN. The AU has only conducted one intervention operation 
since its inception, which was to stop a secession in the Comoros in 
2008. The AU and its subregions have, however, been involved in many 
peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in intrastate conflicts. 
Some of these operations could arguably be viewed as collective 
security applied to intrastate conflicts, for example AMISOM. Although 
the AU often tussles with renegotiating the application of non-
indifference in cases like Darfur and currently in Burundi, the AU has 
taken an assertive stand on unconstitutional changes to governments 
and on coup d'etats in particular. The most common AU response in 
such cases, is to suspend member states, which is often accompanied 
by sanctions, as a form of coercion.  
The success of collective security depends on a number of 
strong powers that are willing and able to enforce the norms and rules 
of collective security. Collective security is a workable, yet imperfect and 
unreliable system for vulnerable countries and populations. Although 
national defence has, since the Cold War, rarely been the biggest con-
cern for most states, the weaknesses and possible failure of collective 
security measures can put significant pressure on core states such as 
South Africa and Nigeria in keeping subregions in Africa stable. Ulti-
mately the integrity and success of both alliances and collective secur-
ity are tested when states have to act to protect the peace, and there 
are usually no guarantees that one or more states will actually come to 
the aid of a victim state or population, or that they will do so with com-
mitment and the desired effect.   
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Endnotes 
1. This paper was delivered at the South Africa Armour Symposium on 20 Oc-
tober 2016, in Bloemfontein. The views expressed in this article are those of 
the author and not the Department of Defence.  
2. Lecturer, Military Strategy Department, Faculty of Military Science, Stellen-
bosch University.  
3. The security dilemma occurs when the one state's efforts to enhance its own 
security, makes another country insecure (Hough 2013: 3). 
4. The Common African Defence and Security Policy, 2004, par 19, p 12, 
describes funding and logistics as fundamental problems and constrains on 
both OAU and AU peace operations.  
5. Johan Galtung argued that there are two types of peace. Firstly, 'negative 
peace' which is the absence of both violence and war, as well as personal 
violence. Secondly, 'positive peace' which goes beyond the mere absence of 
war, and which characterises the absence of structural violence (social 
injustice), and an integration of human society. Social justice would then 
involve an egalitarian distribution of power and resources, as well as 'vertical 
development'. There is, therefore, a close connection between positive 
peace and development (cf Galtung 1964 and 1969). 
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